Impact of Islamic Law on Commercial Sale Contracts – A Private International Law Dimension in Europe by Chuah, J. C. T.
Chuah, J. C. T. (2010). Impact of Islamic Law on Commercial Sale Contracts – A Private International 
Law Dimension in Europe. European Journal of Commercial Contract Law, 4, 191 - 204.
City Research Online
Original citation: Chuah, J. C. T. (2010). Impact of Islamic Law on Commercial Sale Contracts – A 
Private International Law Dimension in Europe. European Journal of Commercial Contract Law, 4, 
191 - 204.
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/789/
 
Copyright & reuse
City  University  London has developed City  Research Online  so that  its  users  may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders. Users may download and/ or print 
one  copy  of  any  article(s)  in  City  Research  Online  to  facilitate  their  private  study  or  for  non-
commercial research. Users may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any 
profit-making activities or any commercial gain. All material in City Research Online is checked for 
eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs from City Research 
Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised to 
check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact  
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
European Journal of Commercial Contract Law 2010–4 191
Impact of Islamic Law on Commercial Sale ContractsJason Chuah*
Impact of Islamic Law on Commercial Sale 
Contracts – A Private International Law 
Dimension in Europe
The steady rise in Islamic finance has necessarily en-
tailed a corresponding rise in transnational1 commerce 
which is guided by Islamic law and practice. There is 
much research literature on the content and scope of 
Islamic law with respect to transnational commerce.2 
The object of this article however is not to engage 
with the scholarly debate as to what Islamic law says 
about how transnational commerce is carried on but 
to question how European transnational sales law 
copes with the direct and indirect effect of Islamic law. 
The research question is essentially one that relates 
to how an established European or Western private 
international law regime should accommodate both 
legally and practically the intervention of Islamic law. 
Although the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (CISG) is not a private 
international law instrument, it represents a harmo-
nised system of law for its signatories. It is intended 
thus to be a substitute for private international law 
where cross-border sale transactions are concerned. It 
would therefore be a significant lapse not to examine 
in this study the implications for the CISG and its 
application in European countries where there is an 
Islamic element in the sale relationship. 
The methodology is largely directed by an appropri-
ate delineation or description of the ‘problem’ in 
question. The ‘problem’ is then examined in the light 
of the current legal regimes applicable to contracts 
for the international sale of goods – domestic private 
international law and the CISG. Specific legal rules 
are examined in the light of legislative intent, case 
law and commercial practice. Some discussion on the 
position of non-country-specific law (such as the lex 
mercatoria) in private international law would also be 
necessary as Islamic law or Sharia is not a country-
specific legal system. In addition, given the limitations 
of this work, we will necessarily have to make certain 
assumptions about the scope and nature of this 
important source of law. 
 The ‘problem’
In reality, the ‘problem’ in question is simpler than 
might be imagined. A merchant in a European country 
enters into a contract with a buyer. The contract may 
or may not contain a choice of law clause and the 
buyer may or may not be established in an Islamic 
jurisdiction.3 However, issues of a conflict with Islamic 
law may arise where the contract of sale needs to 
* Professor of International Commercial Law, Head of the Ad-
vanced Legal Studies Department, University of Westminster. 
I am grateful for the comments of the anonymous referees.
1. The use of the term ‘transnational’ instead of ‘international’ is 
to emphasise the private law perspective of the subject under 
consideration in this article.
2. The voluminous literature on Islamic finance as opposed 
to Islamic commercial law is omitted unless there is an im-
mediate relevance to commercial law. On sources on Islamic 
commercial law, see generally, Berschadsky, ‘Innovative 
Financial Securities in the Middle East: Surmounting the Ban 
on Interest in Islamic Law’, University of Miami Business 
Law Review (2001), 107; Bilal, ‘Islamic Finance: Alternatives 
to the Western Model’, Fletcher F. World Aff. (1999), 145; 
Childress, ‘Saudi-Arabian Contract Law: A Comparative 
Perspective’, St. Thomas L. F. 2 (1990), 69; Coulson, Com-
mercial Law in the Gulf States (London: Graham & Trotman, 
1984); Dar & Presley, ‘Lack of Profit Loss Sharing in Islamic 
Banking’ Int. J. of Islamic Fin. Services 2 (2000), 1; Donboli 
& Kahsefi, ‘Doing Business in the Middle East: A Primer for 
U.S. Companies’, Cornell International LJ 38 (2005), 413; 
El-Gamal, ‘“Interest” and the Paradox of Contemporary 
Islamic Law and Finance’ Fordham Int’l LJ 27 (2003), 108; 
El-Gamal, Islamic Finance Law, Economics and Practice 
(Cambridge, 2006); Foster, ‘Encounters between Legal 
Systems: Recent Cases concerning Islamic Commercial Law 
in Secular Courts’, Amicus Curiae (Nov/Dec 2006) 2; Foster, 
Islamic Commercial Law – An Overview (I) (Barcelona: 
INDret, 2006); Hafeez, Islamic Commercial Law and 
Economic Development (San Francisco, USA: Heliographica, 
2005); Haji Hasan, Sales and Contracts in Early Islamic Law 
(Malaysia, 2007; first published Islamic Research Institute, 
Islamabad, Pakistan, 1994); Hassan, ‘Contracts In Islamic 
Law: The Principles of Commutative Justice and Liberality’, 
Journal of Islamic Studies 13:3 (2002), 257; Ibrahim, ‘The Rise 
of Customary Businesses in International Financial Markets: 
An Introduction to Islamic Finance and the Challenges of 
International Integration’, Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 23 (2008) 
661; Khan, ‘Interaction between Shariah and International 
Law in Arbitration’, Chi. J. Int’l L. 6 (2005-2006), 791; 
Kutty, ‘The Shari’a Factor in International Commercial 
Arbitration’, Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 28 (2006), 
565; Mallat, Introduction to Middle Eastern Law (esp. ch. 
9) (OUP, 2009); Rehman, ‘Globalization of Islamic Finance 
Law’, Wis. Int’l L.J. 25 (2007-2008), 625; Saleh, Commercial 
Arbitration in the Arab Middle East: Shari’a, Syria, Lebanon, 
and Egypt: Shari’a, Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt (Hart Publ., 
2006); Sloane, ‘The Status of Islamic Law in the Modern 
Commercial World’ International Lawyer 22 (1988), 743; 
Suratgar, ‘The Impact of Islamic Banking on World Financial 
and Commercial Relations’, Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 16 (1984), 
1089; Usmani, An Introduction to Islamic Finance (Kluwer, 
2002); also relevant materials at <www.ruf.rice.edu/>, <www.
islamic-banking.com> and <islamic-finance.net/journals/>. 
3. For a useful source of the commercial laws of certain Islamic 
countries, please see <www.jus.uio.no/lm/islamic.law/
islamic.law.html>. 
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be performed in an Islamic country,4 or where the 
contract tries to incorporate Islamic practices into 
the performance of the contract, or where it contains 
a specific reference to Islamic law as the applicable 
law. Moreover, even if the contract is expressed to be 
governed by the CISG (and there are increasingly more 
Islamic countries adopting the CISG5) or a Western 
applicable law and there is no Islamic dimension to the 
contractual performance, the application of the CISG 
or the applicable law may cause specific problems 
where the enforcement or recognition of the judicial 
or arbitral award is sought in an Islamic jurisdiction. 
This is especially the case where the enforcement of 
the award entails the application of Western legal 
constructs which are unacceptable in the eyes of Islam. 
Another interesting issue is whether, and to what 
extent, the CISG, which should be interpreted in ‘good 
faith’,6 might be applied by a tribunal (whether located 
in an Islamic jurisdiction or not) to incorporate Islamic 
principles where there is a strong Islamic cultural 
complexion (such as the parties are trading on a halal7 
basis) in the contractual relationship. 
But, why the focus on sale contracts? It has to be said 
that the issue is particularly acute in sales because many 
international sale contracts, whether Islamic in com-
plexion or not, will need some kind of trade financing. 
As soon as trade financing, whether the documentary 
credit or discounting of bills of exchange or factoring 
or forfaiting, the issue of interest will necessarily have 
to be considered. Islamic businesses and financial insti-
tutions will necessarily have an issue with the charging 
and paying of interest. The imperative on the Islamic 
participants would be to employ Sharia-compliant sale 
financing tools.8 It is therefore especially needful to 
consider the implications of Islamic legal principles on 
contracts for the international sale of goods. 
The problematic issues of conflict could not easily be 
ameliorated by the parties’ private contract; although 
it will be argued that private contractual provision will 
go some distance to reducing the attendant commercial 
and legal risks. The conflict of laws issue in commercial 
contractual relationships is becoming more controver-
sial given the huge furore over the perceived interfer-
ence of Islamic personal law into Western societies – in 
the UK, for example, there was serious disquiet when 
the Archbishop of Canterbury,9 Dr Rowan Williams, 
publicly said10 that the UK should ‘face up to the fact’ 
that some of its citizens do not relate to the British 
legal system and that adopting parts of Sharia law 
could help maintain social cohesion. He also added 
that Muslims should not have to choose between ‘the 
stark alternatives of cultural loyalty or state loyalty’. 
At a transnational level, these ‘stark alternatives’ appear 
to be more and more pronounced; with many more 
Muslim international traders seeking contracts which 
do not compromise their cultural and religious loyalty. 
Few readers of the European Journal of Commercial 
Contract Law will have missed the recent controversial 
Oklahoma Legislative Referendum. Oklahoma 
Referendum State Question No. 755 is now infamous 
despite the vote having only been counted and con-
firmed on 2 November 2010. The State Question asks 
the population of Oklahoma to consider whether to 
approve a change to Article 7(1) of the State Constitu-
tion which will make it imperative for courts to rely 
only on federal and state law when deciding cases. 
The legislative change will also forbid all courts from 
‘considering or using international law ... [and] Sharia 
Law.’ It then defines for the voter international law 
as the law of nations which deals with the conduct of 
international organisations and independent nations 
as being contained in customary law, treaties and 
international agreements. The referendum question 
then describes Sharia law as Islamic law, a law based 
on two principal sources – the Koran and the teaching 
of Mohammed. A staggering 70% of the population 
approved of the proposal. The Oklahoma State Board 
of Elections then scheduled a meeting on 9 November 
2010 to certify the referendum results. That meeting 
has now been stayed by an application to the District 
Court11 from one Mr Awad, the Executive Director 
of the Council on American Islamic Relations. Awad 
argued that State Question No. 755 was not consti-
tutional and the Board of Elections should therefore 
be restrained from certifying the vote. In particular, 
Awad asserted that the ban on the state courts’ use 
and consideration of Sharia law violated the US 
Constitution First Amendment’s religion clauses – the 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.12 In US 
law, for a governmental action to be in breach of the 
Establishment Clause it ‘(1) must have a secular legisla-
tive purpose, (2) its principal or primary effect must be 
4. The term ‘Islamic country’ is used loosely to describe a 
country which applies to a substantial extent the legal prin-
ciples of Sharia. Sharia might be defined as those legal and 
moral principles laid down in the Koran and the teachings of 
Mohammed.
5. Countries with a significant Islamic tradition which have 
adopted the CISG include Turkey, Uzbekistan, Mauritania, 
Lebanon, Kyrgystan, Iraq, Egypt and Syria.
6. Art. 7(1) CISG states that ‘in that interpretation of this 
Convention, regard is to be had to its international character 
and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and 
the observance of good faith in international trade’.
7. Lawful or compliant with Sharia.
8. See below.
9. The Archbishop of Canterbury is the Head of the Church 
of England. For more information about the Archbishop’s 
office, see <www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/>. 
10. See news report by the BBC at <news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
uk/7232661.stm>. 
11. Awad v. Ziriax, Case No. CIV-10-1186-M, United States 
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119660 (9 November 2010).
12. The freedom of religion clauses in the First Amendment 
provide that Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion (the so-called Establishment Clause) 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof (the Free Exercise 
Clause).
EJCCL 2-4.indb   192 17/2/11   10:23
European Journal of Commercial Contract Law 2010–4 193
Impact of Islamic Law on Commercial Sale Contracts
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) 
it must not foster an excessive government entangle-
ment with religion.’13 The court found that the plaintiff 
had shown there was substantial likelihood of success14 
that the proposed amendment was secular because it 
necessitated excessive religious entanglement. Awad 
was especially concerned that the State Question was 
motivated by a malicious intention to disapprove or 
stigmatise his faith. The court also agreed with Awad 
that the proposed amendment would violate the First 
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause because the law 
discriminated against some or all religious beliefs or 
prohibited conduct on the basis that it was undertaken 
for religious reasons.15 Lastly, the temporary restrain-
ing order was given because the court found that al-
leged injury to the plaintiff would outweigh any injury 
to the Board of Elections. Therefore although the 
court recognised ‘the importance of the importance of 
the will of the voters being carried out’, it considered 
that ‘any harm that would result from a slight delay in 
certifying the election results is minimal in comparison 
to the irreparable injury that occurs when an individual 
suffers the loss of his constitutional rights’.16
It is not the object of this article to go into the intrica-
cies of US constitutional law but the Oklahoma case 
clearly demonstrates the tussle between the ‘stark 
alternatives’ that the Archbishop of Canterbury was 
referring to. It should also necessarily be noted that 
the Oklahoma proposal makes no distinction between 
personal and commercial matters. It relates to all 
matters falling under state jurisdiction. 
 The Choice of Law Framework and Sharia
Until recently, on matters of choice of law, the Member 
States of the EU were governed by the Rome Conven-
tion.17 That Convention provided in Article 3 that: 
‘(1) A contract shall be governed by the law chosen 
by the parties. The choice must be express or dem-
onstrated with reasonable certainty by the terms of 
the contract or the circumstances of the case. By their 
choice the parties can select the law applicable to the 
whole or a part of the contract.’
A question thus is whether the contracting parties may 
agree to subject their contract to the governance of 
Islamic law. In an English case, Bank Shamil of Bah-
rain v. Beximco18 the parties had inserted the following 
clause into their contract:
‘Subject to the principles of the Glorious Sharia, this 
Agreement shall be governed by and construed in 
accordance with the laws of England.’19
It is immediately obvious that the clause referred to 
two legal systems as being the applicable laws of the 
contract. The Court of Appeal was asked to overrule 
the lower court’s decision which refused to recognise 
and give effect to the reference to ‘Sharia’. 
It should not be assumed that such clauses are a 
rare occurrence. Many Islamic financial institutions, 
through their Religious Supervisory Boards,20 will 
insist on the use of either explicit or tacit references to 
Islamic law. It is also not inconceivable for commercial 
contracts with an Islamic law clause to be litigated or 
arbitrated in a Western jurisdiction. The jurisdiction 
13. Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, N.M., 541 F.3d 1017, 1030 
(10th Cir. 2008).
14. Which is the standard required for the application for a 
temporary injunction and restraining order. See Dominion 
Video Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 269 F.3d 1149, 
1154 (10th Cir. 2001) where it was held that a party seeking 
a temporary restraining order must demonstrate: (1) there is 
a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) he will 
suffer irreparable injury in the absence of injunctive relief; 
(3) the alleged injury to the movant outweighs the injury to 
the party opposing the motion; and (4) the injunctive relief 
would not be adverse to the public interest.
15. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 
508 U.S. 520, 532, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 124 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1993).
16. See section IV(C) of the lexisnexis judgment. 
17. The Convention on the law applicable to contractual 
obligations negotiated and drawn up by the EU which was 
opened for signature in Rome on 19 June 1980. Although the 
Convention is by and large a measure of EU law (see section 
2 of the Convention) and does indeed require Contracting 
States to refer any questions of law to the European Court 
of Justice and to decide any such question in accordance 
with the principles laid down by the European Court (s. 3 
of the Act), Art. 2 makes it plain that any law specified by 
the Convention (namely the applicable law as ascertained) 
shall be applied whether or not it is the law of a Contracting 
State. Since December 2009, Regulation 593/2008 on the law 
applicable to contractual obligations has come into force 
replacing the Rome Convention. 
18. [2004] 4 All ER 1072 (Court of Appeal); for a detailed analy-
sis of the Islamic financing aspects of the case see Chuah, 
‘International Trade Financing Instruments expressed to be 
governed by Islamic principles – A Study of the Morabaha 
in English Law’, Northwestern Journal of International Law 
and Business 27 (2006), 137.
19. See para. 1 of the judgment. 
20. There is some controversy as to the importance Western 
courts have paid to these religious boards. These boards es-
sentially set the moral and religious direction for the Islamic 
institution however in law, it is not clear how and to what 
extent their decisions are legally binding. In Bank Shamil of 
Bahrain v. Beximco (supra n. 18), it was held that ‘so far as 
the position of the bank’s religious supervisory board was 
concerned, Khan J stated that certification by the board that 
the operations of the bank were according to the Sharia’a 
would not be a decision binding on any court dealing with 
the dispute under the law of Sharia’a. The dispute would fall 
to be resolved by the court in the light of its own view of 
the position under Sharia’a law. In any event there was no 
evidence that the board had had knowledge of, nor was it 
required to approve, the particular transaction in this case, 
its function being one of overall supervision and approval 
of the methods and procedures adopted by the bank in the 
course of its business’ (at para. 34). (See also Financial Times 
21 April 2010; also the English case of The Investment Dar 
Company KSCC v. Blom Developments Bank SAL [2009] 
EWHC 3545 (Ch)).
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question is seen rightly to be quite distinct from the 
question of applicable law. Traders are keen to ensure 
that whilst the substance of the contract is regulated 
by Islamic principles, matters of practicality such as 
process and enforcement are best dealt with in juris-
dictions with convenient, cost-effective and prompt 
procedures. 
Although the issue was one which very much impinged 
on the now defunct Rome Convention, an examination 
of the English decision is important to show how and 
the extent to which the law within the EU has moved 
on. Another reason why a study of the decision is 
relevant is to demonstrate some of the intrinsic issues 
for transnational contracts with an Islamic context. 
At first instance, the judge ruled that English law was 
the governing law because there could not be two 
separate systems of law governing the same contract. 
The Court of Appeal agreed with this, stating with 
some degree of force:
‘Thus the reference to the ‘principles of … Sharia’a’ 
stand unqualified as a reference to the body of Sharia’a 
law generally. As such, they are inevitably repugnant 
to the choice of English law as the law of the contract 
and render the clause self-contradictory and therefore 
meaningless.’21
The court was concerned to note that for the purposes 
of the Rome Convention, only the law of a country 
can be made the applicable law. Sharia law could not 
properly be defined as the law of a particular country. 
This argument is not without force. Article 3(1) of 
the Rome Convention clearly contemplates that a 
contract ‘shall be governed by the law chosen by the 
parties’.22 Article 1(1) in turn seems to emphasise that 
that reference to the applicable law is a reference to the 
law of a country.23 There is no provision for the choice 
or application of a non-national system of law such 
as Sharia law. In any event, Sharia is more than a legal 
code. It also contains religious and moral principles. 
Not only are these plainly matters of controversy, but 
a secular court, such as the English court, is not best 
placed to apply it to resolve commercial disputes. This 
is exacerbated by the fact that there is uncertainty as 
how strictly certain principles are to be interpreted 
or applied. Thus, as a matter of construction of the 
applicable law clause, it ‘was highly improbable that 
the parties to the agreements intended an English court 
to determine any dispute as to the nature or application 
of such controversial religious principles which would 
involve it in the task of deciding between opposing 
points of view which themselves might be based on 
geopolitical and particular religious beliefs’.24
The Court of Appeal, in endorsing the lower court’s 
decision, went on to state that the reference in the 
clause to the Glorious Sharia was not an applicable 
law clause but merely a declaration that the parties 
would attempt to do business in a manner consistent 
21. Para. 40 of the judgment.
22. Emphasis added.
23. Art. 1(1) provides, ‘The rules of this Convention shall apply 
to contractual obligations in any situation involving a choice 
between the laws of different countries’ (emphasis added).
24. See para. 40 of the judgment. 
25. See para. 54 of the judgment. 
26. See Balz, ‘Islamic Law as Governing Law under the Rome 
Convention – Universalist Lex Mercatoria v. Regional 
Unification of Laws’, Unif. L. Rev. n.s. 6 (2001), 37; Junius, 
‘Islamic Finance: Issues Surrounding Islamic Law as a Choice 
of Law under German Conflict of Laws Principles’, Chi. J. 
Int’l L. 7 (2007), 537; El-Gamal, Mahmoud A, ‘Incoherence 
of Contract-Based Islamic Financial Jurisprudence in the Age 
of Financial Engineering’, Wis. Int’l L.J. 25 (2007-2008), 605; 
Mathias Rohe, ‘Application of Sharıˉ’a Rules in Europe: Scope 
and Limits’, Die Welt des Islams Vol. 44, Issue 3, Sharıˉ’a in 
Europe (2004), 323; Balz ‘Islamic Financing Transactions in 
European Courts’ in Ali, Islamic Finance: Current Legal and 
Regulatory Issues (Harvard, 2005).
27. See Junius, ibid. 
28. Heldrich, ‘Article 27’, in Otto Palandt, Burgerliches 
Gesetzbuch (German Civil Code) P 3 at 2580-81 (Munich: 
65th edn., 2006); and Martiny, ‘Article 27’, in Kurt Rebmann, 
Franz Jiirgen Sacker, and Roland Rixecker, (eds.), 10 
Munchener Kommentar zum Burgerlichen Gesetzbuch P 28 
at 1686, P 33 at 1690 (CH Beck, 4th edn., 2006); these sources 
are cited by Junius (ibid.) and it should be noted that there 
have been more recent editions of both texts.
with Islamic religious principles. The court said 
that ‘the words are intended simply to reflect the 
Islamic religious principles according to which the 
bank holds itself out as doing business rather than a 
system of law’.25 Nothing more, it would seem, than 
the sort of ubiquitous corporate social responsibil-
ity clauses found in modern business and corporate 
documentation.
Recent analyses of the issues thrown up in English case 
by commentators dealing with other jurisdictions seem 
to confirm that a Western judicial approach would be 
largely similar to that taken by the Court of Appeal 
in Beximco.26 It should however be said that these 
commentaries relate to the position under the Rome 
Convention; the Rome Convention as alluded to above 
has been superseded by the Rome I Regulation. The 
issue of construction or interpretation of the applicable 
law clause in English law considered the presumed 
intention of the parties within their commercial 
relationship. A German approach, for example, would 
equally consider how workable a particular construc-
tion would be.27 Similarly the issue as to whether the 
law of a non-state might be chosen might be examined 
in the context of the Rome Convention as applied in 
the German international private law (Internationales 
Privatrecht as codified in the second chapter of the 
Einfuhrungsgesetz zum Burgerlichen Gesetzbuch 
(‘EGBGB’)). Most German legal scholars consider that 
the applicable law should mean the law of a state.28 It 
is also an inescapable fact that where other statutes 
are concerned, there is frequently a distinction made 
EJCCL 2-4.indb   194 17/2/11   10:23
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between general legal provisions and those pertaining 
to a state.29 An example pointed out by Junius30 is 
section 1051 para. 1 sentence 1 of the German Code of 
Civil Procedure,31 which relates to arbitration proceed-
ings. That provision states that the arbitration tribunal 
must decide the dispute in accordance with the legal 
provisions the parties have identified as applicable to 
the cause of action. The second sentence of that section 
then goes on specifically to refer to ‘the law or the 
legal order of a specific state’. That reference has been 
interpreted to include laws or rules pertaining to a 
non-state.32 There is however no comparable provision 
in the EGBGB (namely the German implementation 
of the Rome Convention) suggesting therefore that 
only the law of a state might be the applicable law for 
judicial proceedings. 
In contrast, the new Rome I Regulation expressly 
states in recital 13 of the Preamble that it ‘does not pre-
clude parties from incorporating by reference into their 
contract a non-State body of law or an international 
convention’. The legislative history to this provision 
is especially interesting. Initially the Commission 
had proposed an Article 3 which included the words 
‘the parties may also choose as the applicable law the 
principles and rules of the substantive law of contract 
recognised internationally or in the Community’. The 
intention was to allow for the incorporation of the 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts, the Principles of European Contract Law 
(PECL), and potentially the European Contract Law. 
However, there were serious doubts raised about the 
lack of specific guidelines on what counts as ‘substan-
tive law of contract recognised internationally or in the 
Community’.33 Another concern raised was about the 
lack of democratic legitimacy. The law of a non-state 
system is essentially not one which has been demo-
cratically sanctioned – for example if the parties chose 
the UNIDROIT Principles, those Principles have not 
been given legitimacy by any government and as such, 
the application of those principles to the contract by 
a judicial (as opposed to an arbitral) tribunal would 
mean a loss of legitimacy.34 The proposal was subse-
quently dropped and in its place, the more opaque 
words in recital 13 were adopted. 
This legislative history makes it interesting when 
considering the issue of Sharia law as the applicable 
law. If recital 13 were to treated as reflecting the 
original intent of the dropped proposal, then it might 
be suggested that as Sharia law is neither substantive 
contract law nor a body of contract law recognised 
internationally or in the Community, recital 13 could 
not be used to admit Islamic law as the applicable law. 
An analogy might be drawn from the Commission’s re-
jection (from the scope of the now dropped proposal) 
of the lex mercatoria35 for not being precise enough, or 
for being a mere set of private codifications which are 
not adequately recognised by the international com-
munity.36 Recital 13 read in isolation may on the other 
hand cause us a little more difficulty. On the one hand, 
it might be argued that recital 13 is saying no more 
than the obvious37 and lacks any clear impact. Recital 
13 is clearly not backed by an explicit provision in the 
main body of the Regulation. On that basis, it is no 
more than a declaration of intent. 
On the other hand, it might be argued that the free-
standing recital should thus have a wider meaning 
than the now rejected proposed Article 3. After all, 
if the proposed paragraph is rejected that must mean 
it should no longer guide the interpretation of the 
Regulation. Under the Rome Convention, a link was 
made between the applicable law and the law of states. 
Without recital 13, a similar link might be made in 
the Rome I Regulation. After all, there are powerful 
references in Articles 3 and 4 to the law of a country. 
However, against this backdrop, we have to contend 
with recital 13 which clearly allows the parties to 
incorporate into their contracts a non-state body of 
law, and not merely substantive law of contract. That 
said, the order of words in the preamble as conveying 
legislative force is unclear. The recitals are obviously 
relevant to the interpretation of the main text but 
without a set of relevant provisions in the main text, a 
recital would seem to lack legislative force. Recital 13 
perhaps should be seen as being merely a supportive 
provision to recital 14. Recital 14 makes it possible for 
the EU to introduce an instrument of substantive con-
tract law (such as the European Contract Law) which 
in itself may provide that the parties may choose it as 
the applicable law of the contract. Recital 13 merely 
makes Rome I compatible with such an instrument if 
and when it is introduced into Community law. 
The choice of Sharia law is therefore not further 
enhanced by the new Rome I Regulation. If anything, 
29. Balz, ‘Das islamische Recht als Vertragsstatut? zur Entsc-
heidung des London High Court v. 1. 8. 2003, Shamil Bank 
of Bahrain v Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd. and Others’, 
IPRax(Jan/Feb 2005), 44 at 45.
30. Supra n. 26. 
31. ZivilprozeBordnung (ZPO) (civil procedure statute) May 12, 
2005, Bundesgesetzblatt (BGB1) I, as amended.
32. See Balz, supra n. 26. 
33. Leible, ‘Rechtswahl’, in Ferarri & Leible (eds.), Ein neues 
internationales Vertragsrecht für Europa – der Vorschlag für 
eine Rom-I Verordnung (Jena, 2007), 41, 47; Max Planck 
Institute for Comparative and International Private Law 
(MPI) 244.
34. Heiss argued in Ferarri & Leible, Rome I Regulation – The 
Law applicable to Contractual Obligations (European 
Law Publishers, Munich, 2009) at 11 that this argument is 
unpersuasive because the provision merely grants the parties 
autonomy to choose a law, not to impose the application of a 
law on the parties. 
35. For the purposes of this article, we would not be considering 
the intriguing question of whether and to what extent Sharia 
principles of finance and commerce should constitute lex 
mercatoria, regional or otherwise. 
36. See COM (2005) 650 FINAL p. 5.
37. Heiss, supra n. 34, at p 11.
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there is now also a clear exhortation in recital 16  
which requires that the conflict of law rules should be 
highly foreseeable so as to achieve legal certainty in the 
European judicial area. That should thus guide how 
national courts interpret choice of law agreements. In 
a case such as Beximco, the court could very well rely 
on recital 16 to find that an interpretation admitting 
Islamic law not only as an applicable law but as a set 
of rules qualifying the application of the applicable 
law (in Beximco, for example, it was argued that Sharia 
should qualify the application of English law, the 
applicable law) would not lend itself to supporting the 
legal certainty objective. That is especially so when it 
seems to be an accepted position that Sharia law is not 
merely law but a set of moral precepts.38
 Secular applicable law but presence of Sharia 
compliance clause
Conflict of laws is not the only issue of some weight 
where commercial contracts are concerned. A com-
mercial contract might very well be governed by 
Western law, such as the law of an EU Member State 
but the contract may specifically provide for perform-
ance which is compliant with Sharia. For example, 
the contract is expressed to be governed by English 
law but requires the parties to conduct themselves 
in a Sharia-compliant manner. This is different from 
the Beximco clause because here Sharia principles are 
not made the applicable law but the parties are con-
tractually required to observe Sharia in their dealings. 
Effectively, a secular or civil court would be required 
to interpret the contract and decide whether the parties 
have acted in compliance with Sharia as ascertained by 
expert evidence. 
In England, the recent case of The Investment Dar 
Company KSCC v. Blom Developments Bank SAL39 
shows how controversial the issue can be. Indeed, the 
case was described by Moody’s Investors Services as 
having heightened the ‘operational risk’ of Islamic 
financial transactions.40 
In that case, Dar and Blom had entered into a master 
wakala41 contract under which Dar as wakeel (rep-
resentative or agent) would invest monies deposited 
by Blom, the muwakkil. Dar would then pay Blom 
a fixed rate of return irrespective of the performance 
of the investments. The contract was expressed to be 
governed by English law. The contract explicitly pro-
vides in clause 5 that the wakala would be in accord-
ance with Sharia as interpreted by the Sharia supervi-
sory board and would not assert any provision of the 
contract or any transaction under the contract which 
might be in breach of Sharia.42 The investments failed 
and Dar stopped making payments to Blom. Blom 
sued for the repayment of the amounts it invested 
as well as the specified rate of return profit element. 
The action was founded on breach of contract and 
breach of trust (Dar having promised to act as trustee 
(wakeel)). Dar however argued that the wakala as 
structured was contrary to Islamic law because it was 
effectively an investment associated to the payment of 
interest (riba). As such, they reasoned that to continue 
with the contract would be to contravene clause 5 of 
the contract. So what we see is a backdoor incorpora-
tion of Sharia, not as applicable law but as a matter of 
contractual performance. 
When the matter went before the court, there was 
naturally some disquiet especially from Sharia super-
visory boards and the Islamic finance sector.43 The 
concern was that if these instruments had been certified 
by Sharia boards as Islamic law compliant, that deci-
sion should not be questioned before a secular court. 
The court was notably sympathetic to this concern. 
The judge, Purle J, said:
‘It points to the undoubted fact that the Sharia com-
mittee of (I shall assume) respected scholars had 
authorised and approved of this form of contract 
which is a strong indication that the contract was 
indeed Sharia compliant. There was put in before the 
master for TID at the very last moment some rather 
exiguous evidence of Sharia law, which was answered 
overnight and then supplemented by further evidence 
on the part of TID.’44
38. Supra n. 24.
39. [2009] EWHC 3545 (Ch).
40. See news report of 8 July 2010 by Bloomberg at <www.
bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-08/dar-blom-u-k-case-
dismissal-removes-hurdle-for-market-islamic-finance.html>; 
also report in Gulf News on 27 May 2010 at <gulfnews.
com/business/general/dar-blom-battle-raises-sharia-risk-
1.632950?localLinksEnabled =false>.
41. A wakala contract is a Sharia-compliant investment contract. 
In the context of Value Added Tax on such investment 
contracts, a workable example is provided for by UK 
Revenue and Customs in these terms: ‘An investor agrees to 
invest a sum with the bank for an agreed return (e.g. 5%). 
The bank pools the investor’s funds with the funds of other 
investors and its own capital and invests in Sharia compliant 
assets. At the end of a given period (e.g. a month) the bank 
returns the invested sum to the investor along with the agreed 
5%. Any additional revenue that the bank makes on the 
customer’s money is kept by the bank (e.g. if the bank makes 
6% then 5% is given to the customer and the additional 1% 
is kept by the bank). If the bank does not make the agreed 
percentage return then the investor gets what has been made 
whilst the bank gets nothing (e.g. if only 4% is achieved then 
the investor gets the full 4%).’ (See United Kingdom HMRC 
Guidance, VAT FIN 8500.)
42. Clause 5.4 of the contract stipulated: ‘The wakeel shall not 
utilise the wakala assets for any other purpose except what 
is permitted by muwakkil/depositor and within the Sharia 
parameters. The wakeel confirms that the terms of the master 
wakala contract and the transactions contemplated hereby 
are in accordance with the Sharia as interpreted by the Sharia 
committee and it undertakes that it will not at any time 
assert that any provision thereof or any transaction effected 
pursuant hereto contravenes the Sharia.’
43. Supra n. 40.
44. Para. 16 of the judgment (supra n. 39).
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The matter before the court was about summary 
judgment.45 The court held that it was at least arguable 
that (a) the wakala contract was ultra vires because 
Dar’s articles of association did not permit it to make 
investments contrary to Sharia and (b) that the wakala 
contract in question was not Sharia compliant. How-
ever, the court importantly decided that even if the 
transaction was void or unenforceable, Blom would 
have a restitutionary claim because it would have 
mistakenly paid money under a void or unenforceable 
contract. The judge thus said, ‘one way or another 
Blom is bound to succeed’. 
It should, of course, be noted that the case went 
without much event only because there are distinct 
principles of restitution in English law which aided 
Blom. That is not necessarily the case elsewhere, 
including other common law jurisdictions. 
The industry also was relieved that the court did not 
venture to decide whether the wakala was Sharia 
compliant. That said, it should be said that in English 
law, the onus of establishing an arguable case for 
the purposes of summary judgment is not especially 
difficult. An applicant only needed to show that its 
prospects of success were not merely fanciful. That 
said, the issues raised have the potential to cause prob-
lems for Islamic traders and their counterparts. Other 
than the question of Sharia compliance and the worry 
that the secular courts might overturn decisions by 
Sharia boards, is the equally knotty issue of whether 
the Islamic party has the necessary legal capacity to 
make contracts which are not Sharia compliant. 
In the case, Dar was established in Kuwait and its 
constitution states patently that ‘the objectives for 
which the company is established shall be Sharia 
compliant’ and ‘none of the objectives shall be con-
strued and interpreted as permitting the company to 
practice directly or indirectly any usury or non-Sharia 
compliant activities.’46 Whilst in English and EU law 
a company cannot generally avoid their contractual 
obligations on the basis of the lack of vires in their 
articles of association,47 the position is not the same 
elsewhere.48 This also raises the issue of enforcement 
especially at the place of incorporation. The issue of 
capacity may arise in three specific contexts. First, 
the articles of association and/or memorandum of 
association provide that the entity must act according 
to Sharia. Seccondly, the contract in question specifies 
(like in Blom) that the entity must act in accordance 
with Sharia. Thirdly, the country of incorporation 
may have specified in its constitution or public policy 
that the entity must act in a manner consistent with 
Sharia principles. 
As regards the first context, the question is one of in-
terpretation and enforcement of contracts. This places 
an enormous burden on the presiding court and where 
the compliance has been certified by a Sharia board 
may involve judicial intervention into the workings of 
the Sharia board which may not be welcome. This was 
effectively what happened in Blom. 
The second raises the issue of capacity to be assessed 
on the basis of foreign law. The presiding court would 
have to apply its conflict of law rules to determine 
whether and to what extent the law of the place of 
incorporation would guide its decision on lack of 
capacity. 
Last but not least, the constitution or law of the foreign 
state (may be the place of incorporation or the place 
where performance of the contract is sought or the 
place where enforcement of the contract is sought or 
the place where the enforcement of any judgment is 
sought) may dictate the issue of capacity. It is quite 
conceivable that the law of the foreign state may 
make Sharia a law which cannot be derogated from 
by contract or may prohibit the enforcement of any 
performance (contractual or otherwise) which falls foul 
of Sharia. 
 Interpretation of Capacity Clauses
This is largely a matter for domestic law. However, as 
was pointed out in Blom, the Islamic aspect may neces-
sitate the secular court’s intervention in the decisions 
of the Sharia boards. Although the case is primarily 
involved in investment products or instruments, it 
should not be assumed that the implications are not in-
significant to sale arrangements. As alluded to earlier,49 
many international sale arrangements necessitate the 
use of non-interest bearing trade financing instruments. 
The sale contracts are usually structured by Islamic 
45. Part 24.1 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 defines the 
summary judgment procedure in English law as a procedure 
‘by which the court may decide a claim or a particular issue 
without a trial’.
46. See para. 3 of the judgment which reproduces and translates 
Art. 5 of the company’s memorandum of association (supra 
n. 39).
47. Section 39, Companies Act 2006 provides: ‘The validity of 
an act done by a company shall not be called into question 
on the ground of lack of capacity by reason of anything in 
the company’s constitution’. As far as EU law is concerned, 
Art. 9(2) of the First Company Law Directive provides that 
‘the limits on the powers of the organs of the company, 
arising under the statutes or from a decision of the competent 
organs, may never be relied on as against third parties, even if 
they have been disclosed’. 
48. In China, for example, ultra vires is still a good defence for 
a company not to perform a contract which it claims not to 
have the vires to have entered into. See Minkang Gu, Under-
standing Chinese Company Law (Hong Kong University 
Press, Hong Kong, 2006), 50-52. In Islamic countries, the 
capacity of the company or legal person to act may also be 
constrained by Sharia which is incorporated by virtue of the 
country’s constitution or public policy.
49. See above.
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businesses on murabaha50 or bai al-bithaman ajil 51 
or salam,52 istisna53 or musharaka54 terms. These sale 
contract forms may all be subject to Sharia compliance 
procedures as determined by the participants’ Sharia 
supervisory boards. This is particularly so as these 
transactions will usually involve a financial institution 
or an investment house which are expressed to be 
Sharia compliant. The significance of the ruling should 
not therefore be confined to investment contracts.
On the question as to whether the secular or civil 
courts could overturn the recommendations of a Sharia 
advisory board, it may be instructive to turn to a 
decision of the Malaysian High Court involving eleven 
conjoined cases.55 The Malaysian situation is interesting 
because the country operates a dual formal system – Is-
lamic law and civil law are applied in a complementary 
and joined up manner.56 The civil court asserted:
‘There is neither necessity nor reason to refer these 
concepts to the Syariah Advisory Council for any rul-
ing, which in any case, while they are to be taken into 
consideration, are not binding upon the court’.57 
The court thus decided that when applying Islamic 
principles to Islamic transactions, it did not need to 
refer to the Sharia Advisory Council for advice or 
instructions. Its judicial role is distinctive. This is an 
important judgment – not only does it involve some 
of the biggest names in Islamic financing in Asia, 
but, unlike many secular states, Malaysia has adopted 
an explicit and formal legislative framework for the 
implementation of Sharia principles to Islamic finance 
and commerce. 
 Capacity on the Basis of the Corporation’s 
Constitution
The issue of ultra vires is troublesome where the party 
in question is a foreign corporation or legal person. 
The question is whether and to what extent, the 
company’s constitution as deposited and recognised 
in its place of incorporation should also be observed 
by the lex fori where a cross-border transaction is 
being disputed before the forum. It is not the intention 
here to survey the different approaches to the issue of 
whether restitutionary remedies are available where the 
innocent party has made a contract with a public law 
institution which does not have the power to enter into 
such a transaction.58 What is of more interest to this 
article is the legal and practical implications for turning 
to the law of the place of incorporation for assistance 
in dealing with the issue of capacity to contract.
In Haugesund Kommune and Narvik Kommune v. 
Depfa ACS Bank,59 430 local municipalities in Norway 
had entered into a number of swap agreements60 with 
an Irish bank, Depfa ACS Bank. The investments 
were a failure. The local municipalities were therefore 
unable to repay Depfa the amounts owing under 
the swap agreements. The Norwegian municipalities 
commenced proceedings in the English court asking 
for a declaration that they were not liable under the 
50. This is defined as a transaction where the seller makes clear 
the cost he has incurred on the goods for sale and sells it to 
another person by adding a profit or mark-up which is made 
known to the buyer. This is the so-called ‘sale with profit’. 
See <www.qfinance.com/dictionary> (QFINANCE is a 
resource website created by Bloomsbury Information Ltd 
in partnership with the Qatar Financial Centre Authority 
(QFCA)).
51. A sale of goods in which a bank purchases the goods on 
behalf of the buyer from the seller and sells them to the buyer 
at a profit, allowing the buyer to make instalment payments 
(ibid.).
52. This is a contract for the purchase of goods to be delivered at 
a specified time in the future. Payment for the goods is made 
in advance (ibid.).
53. This is a contract for the manufacturing of a product in 
which the manufacturer agrees to produce a specified product 
to be delivered at a specified time for a specified price (ibid.).
54. A type of partnership in which all partners contribute capital 
to an enterprise (including the purchase and resale of goods), 
share profits in a prearranged way, and share losses equally 
(ibid.).
55. Arab-Malaysian Finance Bhd v. Taman Ihsan Jaya Sdn Bhd 
& Ors (Suit No D4–22A–067 of 2003); Bank Islam Malaysia 
Bhd v. Ghazali bin Shamsuddin & Ors (Suit No D4–
22A–215 of 2004);Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd v. Nordin bin 
Suboh (Suit No D4–22A–1 of 2004); Bank Islam Malaysia 
Bhd v. Peringkat Raya (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors (Suit No 
D4–22A–185 of 2005); Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd v. Ramli 
bin Shuhaimi & Ors (Suit No D4–22A–399 of 2005) reported 
in [2008] 5 Malayan LJ 631. The subject matter of these cases 
was whether the bai al-bithaman ajil entered into by these 
parties was valid and consistent with the Malaysian Islamic 
Banking Act 1983 (which incorporates Sharia prohibition 
against interest (riba)).
56. Its Islamic finance and commerce legal infrastructure 
encompasses the following statutes: Islamic Banking Act 
1983, Exchange Control Act 1953, Takaful Act1984, and 
the Capital Markets and Services Act 2007. These and other 
related laws can be found at the Malaysian International 
Islamic Financial Centre’s website, <www.mifc.com/index.
php?ch=menu_law&pg=menu_law_rel>. 
57. At section 30 of the report (ibid.).
58. The problem has surfaced in the UK in a number of cases 
involving Scottish local authorities, Norwegian kommunes, 
German public transport corporation, Italian local govern-
ment etc. See Kleinwort Benson Limited v. City of Glasgow 
District Council [1997] UKHL 43; Haugesund Kommune 
and Narvik Kommune v. Depfa ACS Bank [2010] EWCA 
Civ 579; Berliner Verkehrsbetriebe (BVG) Anstalt Des Of-
fentlichen Rechts v. JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A., JP Morgan 
Securities Limited [2010] EWCA Civ 309; Depfa Bank PLC 
(Depfa) and Dexia Crediop SpA (Dexia) v. Provincia di Pisa 
(Pisa) [2010] EWHC 1148 (Comm) respectively.
59. Ibid.
60. Lord Goff in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v. 
Islington London BC [1996] AC 669, at 680 defined a swap 
in these terms: ‘Under such a transaction, one party (the 
fixed rate payer) agrees to pay the other over a certain period 
interest at a fixed rate on a notional capital sum; and the 
other party (the floating rate payer) agrees to pay the former 
over the same period interest on the same notional sum at a 
market rate determined in accordance with a certain formula. 
... One form of interest rate swap involves what is called an 
upfront payment, i.e. a capital sum paid by one party to the 
other, which will be balanced by an adjustment of the parties’ 
respective liabilities. Thus, as in the present case, the fixed 
rate payer may make an upfront payment to the floating rate 
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swap agreements because under Norwegian law, they 
had no legal power or competency to enter into such 
agreements.61 The question was how and to what 
degree the English court should give force to the 
Norwegian law which provided for the legal capacity 
of the municipalities. 
The starting point is that under the English private 
international law, the question whether the municipali-
ties had the capacity to enter into the contracts with 
Depfa is governed by the law by which the municipali-
ties are constituted, here Norwegian law.62 The Court 
of Appeal found that although the concept of capacity 
in Norwegian law was very different from that in 
English law, for the purposes of English conflict of law 
rules, the concept of ‘capacity’ should be given a broad 
autonomous and internationalist meaning. Hence, 
the constitutional documents which an English court 
would look at when determining the issue of capacity 
of an English company would not necessarily be used 
when assessing the capacity of a foreign corporation 
or legal person. A lack of substantive power under 
Norwegian law principles was therefore equivalent to 
a lack of capacity in English legal terminology and, 
therefore, it followed that the swap agreements were, 
as a matter of English law, invalid and void. To what 
extent this would translate to a public undertaking in 
an Islamic jurisdiction is particularly interesting. If 
Haugesund Kommune applies, the secular court (say, 
the English court) would seek out expert evidence 
of Sharia requirements and then decide whether the 
failure of the Islamic institution or legal entity to 
comply with Sharia requirements is tantamount to 
a lack of capacity, as understood in an autonomous, 
internationalist way. That is a difficult question because 
whilst a breach of Sharia law might render the actions 
of the public institution ultra vires from a public 
law perspective, at private law, the action might well 
enforceable in the light of good faith or morality.
It was also held by the Court of Appeal that the local 
municipalities had failed to establish a public policy 
defence that a restitutionary claim would contravene 
the object of the Norwegian statute which governed 
the powers of the local authorities. The reason for this 
was primarily that although Norwegian public law did 
not confer on its local authorities the power to enter 
into swap agreements, its private law allows persons 
who erroneously but in good faith enter into contracts 
with the local authorities to enforce those agreements.63 
The issue was also recently made the subject of applica-
tion for a preliminary ruling from the European Court 
of Justice. In Case C-144/10 Berliner Verkehrsbetriebe 
(BVG), Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts v. JPMorgan 
Chase Bank N.A., Frankfurt Branch,64 JPMorgan 
sought payment under certain credit default swaps 
in proceedings commenced in England. Berliner 
responded by suing JPMorgan in Germany claiming 
that its board decisions to enter into the credit default 
swap were ultra vires as a matter of German law. 
Berliner also challenged the jurisdiction of the English 
courts on the basis of the provisions of Article 22(2),65 
Council Regulation No 44/2001.66 The Berlin court 
thus referred the following question to the European 
Court of Justice – whether Article 22(2) extends to 
proceedings in which a company or legal person 
objects that decisions of its organs which led to the 
conclusion of the legal transaction are ineffective as a 
result of infringements of its articles of association? 
Whilst the case is not likely to impact on companies 
established in Islamic jurisdictions because those coun-
tries are not Member States for the purposes of Article 
22(2), what it shows is how incapacity problems in 
the country where the company is established or 
incorporated could well have serious implications not 
only for the enforceability of the contract but also for 
jurisdiction contests. Most Member States in the EU 
will have a counterpart to Article 22(2) in its domestic 
private international law as applicable to non-EU 
domiciliaries. In England and Wales, when Regulation 
44/2001 is inapplicable, the doctrine of forum conven-
iens would apply. In that context, England is likely 
not the forum conveniens where the proceedings are 
instituted challenging the validity of a decision of an 
organ of a foreign contracting party (as in Haugesund 
payer, and in consequence the rate of interest payment by the 
fixed rate payer is reduced to a rate lower than the rate which 
would otherwise have been payable by him. The practical 
effect is to achieve a form of borrowing by, in this example, 
the floating rate payer through the medium of the interest 
rate swap transaction.’ 
61. It should be noted that the Irish bank had sought legal advice 
from reputable Norwegian lawyers prior to the making those 
swap agreements. The advice was that the municipalities had 
the requisite power to make those agreements. A counter-
claim made by the bank was therefore against those lawyers 
for negligent advice. 
62. See Dicey, Morris & Collins, The Conflict of Laws, (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 14th edn., 2008), Rule 162; domestic 
English law is relied on because under Regulation 593/2008 
(Rome I), Art. 1(2)(f) specifies that the EU regime for ascer-
taining choice of law will not apply to ‘questions governed 
by the law of companies and other bodies, corporate or 
unincorporated, and the personal liability of officers and 
members as such for the obligations of the company or 
body’.
63. Para. 121 of the judgment. 
64. Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Kammergericht 
Berlin (Germany) lodged on 18 March 2010; OJ C 148 from 
05.06.2010, p. 17.
65. Art. 22(2) states: ‘The following courts shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction regardless of domicile: in proceedings which have 
as their object the validity of the constitution, the nullity 
or the dissolution of companies or other legal persons or 
associations of natural or legal persons, or of the validity of 
the decisions of their organs, the courts of the Member State 
in which the company, legal person or association has its seat. 
In order to determine that seat, the court shall apply its rules 
of private international law.’
66. Regulation of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters.
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and Berliner Verkehrsbetriebe) or the capacity of the 
foreign contracting party itself.
The issue of capacity under the articles the company has 
been established is a serious one in the eyes of Sharia 
as it relates specifically to authority to act whether 
domestically or abroad – the lack of legal authority 
to act will render any ensuing contract incapable of 
performance.67 Although the issue of legal capacity or 
authority is not peculiar for those familiar with doing 
business with emerging markets, the lack of capacity 
as a result of non-compliance with Sharia is quite 
unique. Most cases involving a lack of capacity are 
brought about by a failure to secure a trading licence or 
governmental authorisation to enter into the contracts in 
question. Whilst it is fairly straightforward to determine 
whether a party has a licence or authorisation, it is much 
more problematic to ascertain if an entity has failed to 
satisfy the more nebulous Sharia principles (whether 
or not these principles form part of the Islamic entity’s 
constitutional documents). This is a gap which the 
private law of Western countries seeking to encourage or 
exploit the Islamic market must grapple with. 
The decision in Blom is sure to instigate lawyers and 
trading parties to examine carefully the question of 
capacity and authority under the law of the place of 
incorporation or establishment when dealing Islamic 
clients. Major law firms have therefore suggested that 
advisory or transactional lawyers should:
(a)  request from their Islamic clients a copy of the 
fatwa (or other relevant certificate or approval 
given by an appropriate body such as a Sharia 
advisory board) confirming their detailed consid-
eration of the structure and documents and that the 
transactions are Sharia compliant;
(b)  ensure that the documents include detailed repre-
sentations regarding (i) Sharia compliance and (ii) 
non-conflict with constitutional and other authori-
sation documents; and
(c)  obtain an express waiver of any Sharia-related 
defences.68 
It would also be helpful to check the entity’s constitu-
tional documents to ensure that the proposed transac-
tion is within the company’s powers or authority. 
Of course, it would be especially needful to consider 
carefully incorporating relevant applicable law and ju-
risdiction clauses to provide the best protection against 
any potential default or problems with enforcement. It 
is not enough to be satisfied that the Sharia board has 
approved the transaction; what is additionally needed 
is satisfaction that the party in question would be 
prevented as far as possible from raising the defence of 
incapacity. 
 Sharia as a mandatory requirement and a 
matter of public policy
The issue of capacity may also be framed by the treat-
ment of Sharia as a mandatory requirement or public 
policy of a foreign country. That could impact on the 
recognition of the applicable law to the contract and 
also on the recognition and enforcement of a judgment 
rendered on the transaction in question. 
(a)  Mandatory requirement and applicable law 
The affirmation of party autonomy in EC Regulation 
593/2008 on the law applicable to contractual obliga-
tions (Rome I)69 is not absolute. Article 3(3) provides 
that where all other elements relevant to the situation 
at the time of the choice are located in a country other 
than the country whose law has been chosen, the 
choice of the parties shall not prejudice the application 
of provisions of the law of that other country which 
cannot be derogated from by agreement. It seems 
common ground that Article 3(3) is quite narrow in 
scope – all the other elements relevant to the situa-
tion when the choice was made have to be located in 
another country. The article is generally structured to 
prevent parties to a purely domestic contract avoiding 
the mandatory70 rules of that country by adopting a 
foreign law clause.71 Be that as it may, where the other 
elements point to a country which has as its mandatory 
rules, Sharia, it would follow that subject to the prin-
ciple of legal certainty, the Member State court must 
apply the applicable law subject to those Sharia rules. 
That said, some Sharia principles are not immediately 
and easily ascertainable;72 there are also problems with 
the hierarchy of norms and rules – especially as regards 
whether there are some norms which trump others. 
Another relevant provision is Article 9(3) which 
provides that ‘effect may be given to the overriding 
mandatory provisions of the law of the country where 
the obligations arising out of the contract have to be 
or have been performed, in so far as those overriding 
mandatory provisions render the performance of the 
contract unlawful’. ‘Overriding mandatory provisions’ 
is then defined in Article 9(1) as ‘those provisions the 
respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country 
67. Reza Djojosugito, Mitigating legal risk in Islamic banking 
operations, Humanomics, (2008) Vol. 24 Iss: 2, 110.
68. See Clifford Chance Client Briefing of 8 March 2010 (<www.
cliffordchance.com/publicationviews/publications/2010/03/
islamic_finance_whenwillanenglishcour.html>). 
69. OJ L 177/6 (4 July 2008).
70. Though, the word ‘mandatory’ is used, it is noted that the 
Rome I Regulation makes a distinction between ‘overriding 
mandatory provisions’ and ‘rules which cannot be derogated 
by contract’. Art. 3(3) refers to the latter whilst Art. 9, to the 
former. Further, recital 37 of the Preamble states that ‘the 
concept of “overriding mandatory provisions” … should be 
construed more restrictively’.
71. C.G. Morse, ‘The EEC Convention on the Law Applicable 
to Contractual Obligations’, YBEL 2 (1982), 107 at 124. 
72. See Jafarzadeh, ‘Buyer’s Right to Specific Performance: A 
Comparative Study under English law, the CISG, Iranian and 
Shi’ah Law’ in Pace International Law Review (ed.), Review 
of the CISG 2002-2003 (The Hague: Kluwer, 2004), 133-144.
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for safeguarding its public interests, such as it politi-
cal, social or economic organisation, to such extent 
that they are applicable to any situation falling within 
their scope’, irrespective of the applicable law of the 
contract. As regards Sharia, it is not inconceivable that 
for the Islamic country in question, its preservation 
and adherence have to be crucial for the safeguarding 
the country’s social organisation. Under Article 9, the 
forum does not have to give effect to the mandatory 
provisions. It has discretion,73 but the principles guid-
ing the exercise of that discretion are limited. Article 
9(3) simply suggests that when considering whether 
to give effect to those mandatory provisions, ‘regard 
shall be had to their nature and purpose and to the 
consequences of their application or non-application’. 
It is quite understandable that the Regulation should 
not over-restrict the exercise of judicial discretion by 
the forum.74 However, this matter is of some delicacy 
because accusations of legal chauvinism may be made 
about the presiding forum. In the light of the strained 
relations as that seen in Oklahoma, that is not a fanciful 
prospect. 
The introduction of discretion was so that the forum 
judiciously will not create undue uncertainty to the 
transaction when deciding whether or not to apply the 
mandatory rule in question.75 That element of judicial 
control is thus important but given the EU-wide 
dimension of the Regulation, a requirement to apply 
the Regulation in a uniform manner would be particu-
larly useful. In the Regulation, an exhortation usually 
found in international conventions calling for national 
courts to apply the law in an internationalist manner 
seems absent. 76 In the CISG, for example, Article 7(1) 
states quite explicitly that ‘in the interpretation of [the] 
Convention, regard is to be had to its international 
character and to the need to promote uniformity in its 
application and the observance of good faith in inter-
national trade’. There is a real likelihood as far as Sharia 
is concerned that one Member State might hold a 
Sharia principle to be a mandatory requirement whilst 
another might not. Very little damages the growth of 
transnational finance and commerce more than legal 
and commercial uncertainty.
(b)  Enforcement of judgments and Sharia as public 
policy 
This is not the place to concentrate too much on the 
enforcement in an Islamic jurisdiction of a judgment 
rendered by an EU Member State. However some 
valuable lessons might be learnt – after all, there is 
no point for lawyers and judges in a Member State 
to allow a long and convoluted trial to proceed when 
there is little likelihood of recognition and enforcement 
of the ensuing judgment at a place where the assets are 
located. 
In general, the law on enforcement and recognition in 
a number of Islamic countries,77 like in many countries 
globally, is constrained by two important pillars – the 
presence of reciprocity and the incorporation of a 
public policy exception. These principles are especially 
pronounced in the Arab League Conventions of 195278 
and 1983.79 Although the Conventions are relevant 
only to the members of the Arab League, their provi-
sions are especially useful in aiding our understanding 
of the role of Sharia in the enforcement of foreign 
judgments. 
Foreign judgments and awards would not be enforced 
unless there is some sort of reciprocity, generally. The 
1952 Convention is based on the Geneva Conven-
tion on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
1927 which requires reciprocity from its contracting 
countries. 
On the link between public policy and Sharia, the 
connection was implied in the Arab League Conven-
tion 1952 – Article 2 provides that enforcement80 may 
be withheld where the foreign judgment does not 
accord with the public order or morals in the State 
or when it violates the international public order. In 
the newer 1983 Convention, the connection is more 
explicit. Article 30 states that a judgment which 
violates the Sharia, the Constitution, the public order 
or morals of the country where recognition is sought 
would not be enforced. What is especially interesting 
is the clear demarcation drawn between Sharia and the 
73. Uncertainty was a major concern of the UK when it 
decided to opt out of Art. 7(1) of the Rome Convention (the 
predecessor to the Rome I Regulation). Art. 7(1) read: ‘When 
applying under this Convention the law of a country, effect 
may be given to the mandatory rules of the law of another 
country with which the situation has a close connection, if 
and in so far as, under the law of the latter country, those 
rules must be applied whatever the law applicable to the 
contract. In considering whether to give effect to these 
mandatory rules, regard shall be had to their nature and 
purpose and to the consequences of their application or 
non-application.’ (emphasis added). Art. 9(3) is more accept-
able to the UK because it does not make it mandatory but 
discretionary to give effect to such overriding provisions. 
74. Ibid.
75. McClean, ‘Perspectives on Private International Law at the 
Turn of the Century’, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publish-
ers, 2000), 214-215.
76. The closest equivalent in the Regulation is recital 16 of the 
Preamble – ‘to contribute to the general objective of this 
Regulation, legal certainty in the European judicial area, the 
conflict-of-law rules should be highly foreseeable. The courts 
should, however, retain a degree of discretion to determine 
the law that is most closely connected to the situation.’
77. The term is used fairly loosely here to include countries 
which have a significant Islamic tradition. 
78. Officially called the Convention on the Enforcement of 
Foreign Judgments and Awards 1952.
79. Officially called the Convention on Judicial Cooperation 
between States of the Arab League 1983. Signed by many of 
the Arab League nations but not ratified by all. Where not 
ratified, the Arab League Convention 1952 would apply. 
80. Interestingly, the Arab League Convention 1952 does not 
provide for recognition of foreign judgments and awards, 
only enforcement of such judgments and awards. 
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constitution of the state; it seems therefore to place 
emphasis not only on those Sharia principles which are 
part of the state’s domestic legislative provisions but 
also the wider less formal provisions of Sharia. 
 Regard for the place of performance 
When applying a foreign law, the court is also required, 
under Article 12(2) Rome I Regulation, ‘in relation to 
the manner of performance and the steps to be taken 
in the event of defective performance’ to have regard 
‘to the law of the country in which performance takes 
place’. This provision is especially relevant when the 
applicable law is not the law of the country where 
performance takes place. This article is thus capable of 
causing some difficulties where the place of perform-
ance (say, in an Islamic jurisdiction81) prohibits the 
charging of interest (say, for late performance) but the 
applicable law is the law of an EU Member State which 
allows it. 
It should be said that this provision would only apply 
where the issue relates to the ‘method and manner of 
performance’; in matters relating to ‘performance’, 
Article 12(1)(b) makes it quite plain that that is for 
the applicable law to deal with. The question thus is 
whether the payment of interest for late performance, 
etc., is a matter relating to the method and manner of 
performance, or merely a matter of performance. An 
old British Commonwealth case might be instructive. 
In Mount Albert Borough Council v. Australasian 
Temperance and General Assurance Society,82 a New 
Zealand local authority had issued debentures to an 
insurance company in Victoria, Australia. The interest 
rate on the debentures was 5 2/3 per cent and payable 
in Victoria. In 1931 during the Great Depression, the 
Victorian legislature passed a statute reducing all mort-
gage rates to 5 per cent. It was held that the statute did 
not apply to the debentures because although Victoria 
was the place of performance, New Zealand law was 
the proper law of the debentures. The Privy Council 
(on appeal from the New Zealand Supreme Court) 
took the view that the question of amount of interest 
was material to the contract. It was not ancillary to the 
substance of the transaction. If that analysis is adopted, 
it would seem to follow the question of interest (say, 
for late performance) in a sale transaction is not about 
the method or manner of performance but the per-
formance itself. Article 12(1)(b) would therefore apply 
leaving it a matter for the applicable law rather than the 
law of the place of performance. This analysis is largely 
supported by the Giuliano Lagarde Report83 (which 
guided the interpretation of the Rome Convention, the 
predecessor to the Rome I Regulation). The Giuliano 
Lagarde Report gives the following as examples of 
what might constitute ‘method and manner of per-
formance’ – rules governing public holiday, how the 
goods are to be examined and the steps to be taken to 
reject the delivery of goods. The Report also stressed 
that the following would be presumed to be matters 
relating to performance (as against method and manner 
of performance): 
‘the diligence with which the obligation must be 
performed; conditions relating to the place and time of 
performance; the extent to which the obligation can be 
performed by a person other than the party liable; the 
conditions as to performance of the obligation both in 
general and in relation to categories of obligation (joint 
and several obligations, alternative obligations, divis-
ible and indivisible obligations, pecuniary obligations); 
where performance consists of the payment of a sum of 
money, the conditions relating to the discharge of the 
debtor who has made the payment, the appropriate of 
the payment, the receipt, etc.’84
All this serves to remind us that Article 12(2) is to 
be interpreted narrowly. The norm is for the applic-
able law to govern the performance of the contract. 
However there will be situations where the question is 
about the method and manner of performance thereby 
invoking the involvement of Sharia as applicable in 
a foreign country.85 For example questions may arise 
about the extent to which pre-payments or rebates are 
permitted,86 or what constitutes possession.87
 Impact of Sharia on the workings of the CISG 
as an applicable law 
The focus here is on the workings of the CISG as the 
contract’s applicable law where there exists an Islamic 
legal dimension. The CISG was developed with a view 
to creating a legal framework of general application to 
81. In the United Arab Emirates, for example, Part 2 of the 
Commercial Code – Commercial Obligations and Contracts 
states in Art. 76 that ‘a creditor shall have the right to 
demand interest on a commercial loan in accordance with the 
rates stipulated in the contract … not [to] exceed 12 per cent’. 
(Dawoud Sudqi El Alami (transl.), The Law of Commercial 
Procedure of the United Arab Emirates: Issuing Law No 18 
of 1993, (1993), 46). That said, the Dubai Court of Cassation, 
in Judgment No 261/96, held that a creditor was entitled to 
collect 15 per cent interest on a debt the payment of which 
had been considerably delayed. (Price & Al Tamimi, United 
Arab Emirates Court of Cassation Judgments: 1989-1997 
(1998), 51-52). Indeed, many Islamic countries (e.g. Pakistan, 
UAE, Morocco, Qatar, Kuwait, Egypt) have made a clear 
distinction between civil and commercial matters, and have 
permitted to some extent foreign commercial and financial 
transactions to be exempt from the proscription against riba 
and gharar (see Shaaban, ‘Commercial Transactions in the 
Middle East’, Law & Policy in International Business 31 
(1999), 157).
82. [1938] AC 224.
83. See Official Journal of the European Communities of 31 
October 1980 (OJ C282/1980).
84. At pp. 32-33 of the Report, supra n. 16.
85. It should be underscored that there is uncertainty as to the 
availability of Sharia as the applicable law of the contract 
under the Rome I Regulation (see above).
86. See Usmani, An Introduction to Islamic Finance (1999), 
141-143 and al-Zuhayli, Financial Transactions in Islamic 
Jurisprudence: A Translation of Vol 5 of Al-Fiqh al-Islami wa 
Adillatuhu (2003), 328.
87. Usmani, ibid., p. 106.
EJCCL 2-4.indb   202 17/2/11   10:23
European Journal of Commercial Contract Law 2010–4 203
Impact of Islamic Law on Commercial Sale Contracts
the international community of nations.88 It is not the 
intention here to deal with the wider political question 
of whether the drafters of the CISG took into account 
the economic situation in developing countries89 or 
Islamic countries.90 
The role of an applicable law is seriously diminished if 
it cannot be applied and enforced by a chosen forum. 
In most parts, the CISG as an applicable law does not 
conflict with Sharia principles,91 however there is major 
sticking point – Article 78. Article 78 provides that ‘if 
a party fails to pay the price or any other sum that is 
in arrears, the other party is entitled to interest on it, 
without prejudice to any claim for damages recover-
able under article 74’.92 The CISG does not offer any 
guidance on how interest is to be calculated preferring 
to leave it to national law. However, where the national 
law in question is one which has adopted Sharia as its 
source or basis, it is not inconceivable for a judgment 
debtor to claim that the award of interest on the dam-
ages ordered would be invalid. 
It is immediately obvious that this then is largely 
a matter of interpretation for the court or tribunal 
in question.93 It has been suggested elsewhere94 that 
different Islamic countries have dealt with the prohibi-
tion of interest in the award of damages in a somewhat 
pragmatic way. In Egypt, for example, Article 226 of 
the Civil Code expressly states that ‘when the object 
of an obligation is the payment of a sum of money of 
which the amount is known at the time when the claim 
is made, the debtor shall be bound, in case of delay in 
payment, to pay the claimant, as damages for the delay, 
interest …’.95 Similar provisions are found elsewhere 
despite the fact that in many Islamic countries, the state 
constitution will usually contain a provision prescrib-
ing Sharia as the principal source of law96 or that no 
law shall contravene the beliefs and provisions of the 
sacred religion of Islam97 or that the courts are obliged 
to refrain from executing statutes and regulations of 
the government that are in conflict with the laws or the 
norms of Islam.98 The judicial construct of ‘interest’ in 
the context of compensation is especially interesting. In 
a case cited by Akaddaf,99 the Egyptian Supreme Con-
stitutional Court held controversially that Article 226 
prevailed because it was enacted before the constitu-
tion. As can be seen this is a purely technical construct 
– it was not discussed whether substantially Article 226 
might be reconciled to the proscription against riba/
interest. Other devices to avoid the proscription in the 
context of compensation include treating the prohibi-
tion as applicable only to natural persons and not legal 
entities,100 or not applicable to foreigners or foreign 
corporations101 or calling it ‘compensatory indemnity’ 
instead of interest.102 
The CISG as an international convention permits 
countries to opt out of certain provisions. It is clear 
that Islamic countries that have signed up to the 
CISG did not opt out of Article 78. Whilst some 
commentators suggest that this is reflective of these 
countries’ desire not to be isolationists,103 it might also 
be hypothesised that with the Islamic financial sector 
growing and the rise of resurgent sense of Islamic 
identity it is not inconceivable that these countries will 
seek to opt out or disapply Article 78 as being contrary 
to their constitutional legal commitment to Sharia. 
 Conclusion
This article has touched on a number of conflict-of-law 
problems which might occur in EU Member States 
where Sharia or Islamic law is an element in the parties’ 
contractual relationship. From international conven-
tions such as the CISG to transnational tools like the 
INCOTERMS 2010, or from domestic private inter-
national law to the Rome I regime, there is evidently a 
great desire to ensure that international commerce can 
88. The Preamble reads: ‘CONSIDERING that the development 
of international trade on the basis of equality and mutual 
benefit is an important element in promoting friendly rela-
tions among States, 
 BEING OF THE OPINION that the adoption of uniform 
rules which govern contracts for the international sale of 
goods and take into account the different social, economic 
and legal systems would contribute to the removal of legal 
barriers in international trade and promote the development 
of international trade …’.
89. Jeswald W. Salacuse, ‘From Developing Countries To Emerg-
ing Markets: A Changing Role for Law in the Third World’, 
Int’l Law 33 (1999), 875.
90. Akaddaf, ‘Application of the United Nations Convention 
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) 
to Arab Islamic Countries: Is the CISG Compatible with 
Islamic Law Principles?’, Pace International Law Review 13 
(2001), 1.
91. Ibid.
92. Art. 74 in turn provides ‘Damages for breach of contract by 
one party consist of a sum equal to the loss, including loss 
of profit, suffered by the other party as a consequence of 
the breach. Such damages may not exceed the loss which the 
party in breach foresaw or ought to have foreseen at the time 
of the conclusion of the contract, in the light of the facts and 
matters of which he then knew or ought to have known, as a 
possible consequence of the breach of contract.’
93. Art. 7(2) of the CISG requires that, ‘[q]uestions concerning 
matters governed by this Convention which are not expressly 
settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general 
principles on which it is based or, in the absence of such 
principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of 
the rules of private international law.’
94. Supra n. 90.
95. See John Y. Gotanda, ‘Awarding Interest in International 
Arbitration’, Am. J. Int’l L. 90 (1996), 40.
96. Arts. 46 and 48, Constitution of Saudi Arabia; similarly Art. 
7 of the Constitution of the United Arab Emirates.
97. Art. 3, Constitution of Afghanistan. 
98. Art. 170, Constitution of Iran.
99. Supra n. 90.
100. Supra n. 90.
101. Shaaban, supra n. 81, at p. 170. 
102. Klaus Peter Berger, International Arbitral Practice and 
the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 129 (1998).
103. Supra n. 90.
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take place in a harmonised legal province. However, 
with Islamic commerce bursting onto the international 
scene in recent times and against the backdrop of 
intensified perceptions of admissibility of Islamic law 
into Western societies, a legal recognition of Islamic 
principles in international commerce is not easy to 
achieve. What might help in a modest measure is a 
better understanding of the current legal framework. 
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